Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Social public procurement policies have long been used as an instrument to reach social goals (McCrudden, 2004 and McCrudden, 2007) . Already in the 19th century public contracts were linked to labor and employment standards in some countries like the US or in England. Later on governments attempted to use public contracting to reduce discrimination against women, racial minorities or disabled (McCrudden, 2004) . A wide range of literature focusing mainly on programs in the US promoting labor market chances for minority groups shows that social public procurement policy can successfully reach the social goals set by the government (see for example Holzer and Neumark, 2000 for the effect of affirmative action programs in the US). However, the literature suggests that there are also potential drawbacks of the policy instrument like higher costs (Marion, 2009) or fraudulent firm behavior (Holzer and Neumark, 2000) . We use the case of Switzerland, where public procurement policy aims to increase the number of training places provided by private firms, to analyze the effectiveness of social public procurement policy.
In Switzerland most public purchasers can nowadays account for training activities when awarding public contracts. Most of these regulations were introduced into public procurement laws in the last decade as a result of a shortage of training places. Promoting the supply of training places is particularly important because apprenticeship training is the most important educational pathway in Switzerland. Two-thirds of Swiss youths enter 2-to 4-year apprenticeship training programs after completing compulsory schooling, in which apprentices receive firm-based training and education at a vocational school. A well-functioning apprenticeship training system with a balanced demand and supply of training places is therefore crucial for the professional careers of young adults in Switzerland. However, for various reasons, such as demographic changes or the business cycle (see Muehlemann, 2009) imbalances are quite frequent. There has been a scarcity of training places in the 90s and at the beginning of the last decade (e.g. Schweri and Mueller, 2007) , whereas today, there is an over-supply of training positions. As a reaction to the shortage in training positions in the 90s, the government attempted to increase the supply of 1 training places using for example public procurement policy. The aim of this social public procurement policy is to use a government's market power to achieve social goals such as increasing the number of apprenticeship training places.
The training literature 1 indicates that a firm's training decision is also an economic decision. Firms compare the costs and benefits of training when they decide to employ and train apprentices. Easier access to public contracts could serve as a training benefit and therefore increase firms' incentives to offer training programs. From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear whether this policy instrument can create sufficient incentives to change firms' training behavior. Muehlemann et al. (2007) demonstrate that the average non-training firm in Switzerland would face training costs of approximately 40,000
Swiss francs (or approximately 40,000 USD at the current exchange rate) if it were forced to provide training (see also Wolter et al., 2006, who show that non-training firms are subject to high net training costs). In contrast, for the average Swiss firm offering training, training is profitable. These empirical results raise the question of whether there are enough non-training firms that expect sufficiently high benefits from preferential treatment in public procurement to outweigh their potential training costs. Thus the policy instrument only creates training incentives for firms in which public contracts play a substantial role. Moreover, the policy affects only firms in industries where public contracts exist. Therefore, the policy can only be successful if there are a substantial number of such non-training firms in these industries.
In Switzerland, the most important public purchasers are cantons (similar to states in the US) and communities. Their contracts account for approximately 80 percent of public contracts in Switzerland (Felder and Podgorski, 2010) . Cantons pass public procurement laws for public contracts at the canton and community level. Over the last two decades, nearly all cantons have modified these laws and allowed training firms to receive preferen-tial treatment when awarding public contracts. 2 Most cantonal procurement laws contain a non-exhaustive list of potential criteria (additional to the price) for the reward of public contracts. Training apprentices might be one of these potential criteria. Therefore, the existence of this "apprenticeship training" criterion in the law does not mean that all cantons and communities grant training firms preferential treatment in all public contracts. First, the laws allow public purchasers to apply the criterion, but it is not mandatory to provide preferential treatment for training firms. 3 Second, in accordance with international laws (WTO-GPA), the criterion can only be applied to contracts below a certain contract volume threshold. Large projects above this threshold for which international firms compete for the contract are excluded, as foreign firms are not allowed to be discriminated against Swiss firms.
The present paper analyzes whether providing preferential treatment to training firms in the public procurement process increases the number of training firms and thus the number of training places and a firm's training intensity. In addition to the effect on training quantity, this study investigates the effect of such a policy on training quality.
Analyzing the effect on training quality is crucial to assess the suitability of the instrument, as only high-quality training provides young individuals with the necessary skills for a successful professional career.
To estimate the effect of the "apprenticeship training" criterion in public procurement laws on the number of training places, we first exploit that such a criterion exists in almost all Cantons in 2009, and use cross-sectional survey data that includes subjective information on whether a firm is affected by the criterion. As robustness check we use the introduction of the criterion in a number of cantons between 2004 and 2009 to estimate the causal effect of the "apprenticeship training" criterion on a firm's training propensity.
The results reveal that allowing for the preferential treatment of training firms in the public procurement process increases the number of training firms and therefore the number of training places. However, the instrument only affects a very small number of firms in certain industries where public contracts play a substantial role. Moreover, as the instrument primarily changes the training behavior of small firms (i.e., at the extensive margin) and does not affect the number of apprentices within a training firm (i.e., at the intensive margin), the overall increase of apprenticeship training places is rather small.
The results derived from the cross-sectional analysis are confirmed by the difference-indifferences analysis as the ranges of the effects strongly overlap. The result that training quality remains high for firms that offer apprenticeship places because of the public procurement policy is a promising finding for the apprenticeship training system and the policy instrument.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature and derives the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
Literature and Hypotheses
There is no scientific study of the effect of public procurement policy on firm training incentives. Nevertheless, the instrument is related to other social public procurement policy instruments. The following studies examine public procurement as an instrument to achieve social goals and contribute to the development of our research hypotheses. Mc-Crudden (2004 , 2007 demonstrates that public procurement has long been used as an instrument to achieve social goals. 4 Empirical assessments of the impact of public procurement policies on social outcomes generally focus on the US, where such programs seek to increase labor market success for minorities. Several programs at the federal, state or local level have existed since the early 1970s. Most of them set aside or set percent-age goals for public contracts for minority-owned firms (and subcontractors). Further programs compelled contractor firms to introduce antidiscrimination policies. Empirical findings suggest that the employment of black males rose more rapidly in contractor firms than non-contractor firms as a result of affirmative action in contracting and procurement (Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1976; Chatterji et al., 2013; Goldstein and Smith, 1976; Heckman and Payner, 1989; Heckman and Wolpin, 1976; Leonard, 1984a Leonard, ,b, 1990 . 5 Moreover, several empirical studies reveal an increase in the number of public contracts involving minority-owned firms as a result of affirmative action programs (e.g., Bates and Williams, 1996) Although a number of studies suggest that affirmative action policies 6 are successful in achieving social goals, the policies also have disadvantages. Marion (2009) , for example, presents evidence of higher costs in public works projects as a result of affirmative action.
Moreover, the potential for fraudulent behavior cannot be excluded (Holzer and Neumark, 2000) , and there is a risk that firms will be more likely to fail (Bates and Williams, 1996) , as the policy might create weak companies that are highly dependent on government contracts (Holzer and Neumark, 2000) .
Besides the literature on social public procurement policy, the training literature serves for building hypotheses. The "apprenticeship training" criterion introduced in the most public procurement laws is also related to other policy instruments designed to provide incentives for firms to train apprentices, such as subsidies. The training literature provides empirical evidence demonstrating that subsidies influence the training decision and increase the number of training places (see, for example, Westergaard-Nielsen and Rasmussen, 1999 for Denmark or Muehlemann et al., 2007, for Switzerland) . However, introducing subsidies to promote the creation of new training places may be a very expensive policy, if not only "new" training places but also "old" ones are subsidized, thereby creating windfall gains. Distinguishing between "new" and "old" training firms seems practically and politically unfeasible. Therefore, although subsidies are highly effective in creating new training places, such a policy is very costly and thus not efficient. The empirical evidence reveals that the average non-training firm in Switzerland would change its training behavior if it were to receive a subsidy of approximately 40,000 Swiss francs (Muehlemann et al., 2007) . As the surcharge for training firms in public contracts is rather low (in most cases not more than five percent), it is unclear whether including this criterion in public procurement laws can create benefits sufficient to change the training behavior of a substantial number of non-training firms.
In summary, two strands of literature are considered for deriving hypotheses on the effectiveness of the "apprenticeship training" criterion in public procurement policy. Similar to affirmative action in contracting and procurement in the US, the "apprenticeship training" criterion in Swiss public procurement policy is intended to advantage firms that act according to the goals established by the government (increasing the number of training places). Although the designs and goals of the policies differ, the results from studies on the US suggest that public procurement policies can change firm behavior. However, evidence on non-training firms in Switzerland suggests that the effect size of such a policy may be rather small because of the significant potential net training costs for non-training firms. While training firms are more likely to be awarded a public works contract and can charge higher prices 7 than non-training firms, these expected benefits must outweigh the net costs of training to change a firm's training behavior. Therefore, the policy will only be successful if a sufficient number of such non-training firms exist.
A firm's training propensity increases strongly in firm size. Large firms train more often because they may benefit more from training: First, the probability that a firm employs workers in at least one training occupation increases in firm size. Second, small firms are often specialized, which makes it more difficult (and thus costly) to provide the apprentice with the required training content and simultaneously reduces the opportunity to allocate productive tasks to the apprentice. However, large firms have a broader range of tasks for apprentices and can therefore better integrate them into the production process, where apprentices create benefits for firms. Third, larger firms with numerous employees need to fill more vacancies than small firms. Blatter et al. (2012) demonstrate that hiring costs increase in the number of hires. It is therefore beneficial for large firms to diversify their recruitment strategies and use training as a recruitment device to satisfy their future need for skilled workers.
Therefore, we can assume that the inclusion of the criterion in legal frameworks increases the probability that training firms will be treated preferentially in the public procurement process, and as a consequence, the policy creates training incentives at the margin, affecting only a small number of small-sized, non-training firms with positive but relatively low (expected) net training costs. Furthermore, because public contracts should be more prevalent in certain industries, we expect heterogeneous effects across industries.
Training firms could also create additional apprenticeship training places if the policy were able to incentivize training firms to increase the number of training places. The requirements for the preferential treatment of training firms in many cantons, however, are applied with respect to firm size and according to the customary number of apprentices in the industry. Furthermore, the majority of Swiss training firms are small firms with one or two apprentices. Therefore, we assume that the policy does not increase the number of training places in training firms.
In addition to the effect on training quantity, this study provides an analysis of the effect on training quality. In the context of training, quality aspects are very important, as only high-quality training provides young individuals with the skills required for a successful professional career. There could be a trade-off between creating additional training places and training quality, as firms that only provide training to obtain preferential treatment in the public procurement process might be less prone to provide high-quality training. Nevertheless, a decrease in quality may be unlikely due to legal constraints and the reputational considerations of training firms (Wolter and Ryan, 2011) . Therefore, we assume that the public procurement policy has no negative effect on training quality.
Data
To analyze the effect of a public procurement policy on a firm's training behavior, this paper uses a representative firm-level cross-sectional dataset that was collected in 2009 to analyze the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Switzerland. To account for the stratified sampling the results presented in this article are weighted by sampling weights. 8 For the robustness check, we additionally use the same type of dataset collected As the focus of this analysis is on the impact of the "apprenticeship training" criterion on private firms, public institutions are excluded from the dataset. Moreover, only non-training firms that are theoretically capable of offering training are considered in the analysis. 9 Finally, Ticino canton is excluded from the analysis. 10
After the exclusion of public firms, firms that theoretically cannot train, and firms located in the Ticino canton, a total of 7,115 firms remain in the sample for the 2009 survey. Among those firms, 17 percent indicated that there exists a criterion "apprenticeship training" in their field of activity (yes or partially). In contrast, 68.2 percent of the firms are not at all affected by such a criterion. Table 1 shows that the share of firms indicating that such a criterion exists in their field of activity is larger for training firms than for non-training firms. Question: Are training firms in your field of activity (canton, industry) treated preferentially when applying for public works or services?
The large number of firms (two-thirds) not being affected by the policy combined with the fact that almost all cantons knew such an "apprenticeship training" criterion by 2009 indicates that public procurement policy affects only a small fraction of firms in particular industries. Public contracts are typically concentrated in certain industries, such as construction, while public contracts are almost non-existent in other industries.
The present analysis addresses this fact by first identifying the affected firms in industries with public contracts ( Table A1 in the Appendix shows the share of affected firms by a two-digit industry level). Therefore, we exclude all firms in industries that are unaffected by public contracts, i.e. have a very small share of firms indicating that they are affected by such a policy. 11, 12 Moreover, export-oriented firms (only 2.6 percent of all firms) are excluded as they are assumed to have no public contracts in Switzerland. Thus, 1,744 firms remain for the further analysis: 48 percent of these firms indicated that public purchasers in their field of activity consider apprenticeship training when awarding the contract (see Table 2 ). The descriptive statistics in Table 1 and Table 2 suggest that there exists a positive relationship between the "apprenticeship training" criterion in public procurement and the training probability. However, firms affected and not affected by the policy may differ in many other characteristics. Therefore, this result does not reveal a causal effect of public procurement policy on training behavior.
The survey information on the preferential treatment of training firms is subjective.
However, it is difficult to collect information about the firms' objective affectedness of the criterion because even if the criterion exists in the legal foundations of a canton, public purchasers are free to apply them and, particularly at the community level, political borders do not demarcate the market for public contracts. Therefore, subjective information directly from a firm is the best available of information that can be used to analyze this topic in the absence of panel data or other information. 13 Table 2 shows that some firms did not answer the question on the "apprenticeship training" criterion. To take these nonresponses into account and avoid a non-response bias, we estimate several scenarios (see section 5).
In addition to estimating the effect of public procurement policy on the number of training places (quantity), the cost-benefit data makes it possible to investigate potential A lower value for the relative productivity due to the public procurement policy would indicate that apprentices receiving training as a result of such a policy are not as well prepared for their future professional careers than other apprentices. Descriptive statistics for the quality measures are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Empirical Strategy
To calculate the average treatment effect and to control for differences between firms affected and not affected by the criterion, this paper adopts a matching strategy. The applied nearest neighbor matching (Abadie et al., 2004) ensures that only firms with similar (observable) characteristics are compared. The effect of the treatment can be defined in a potential outcome framework (Rubin, 1974) . Y i (1) denotes the outcome (training behavior or training quality) of firm i when exposed to the treatment, and Y i (0) is the outcome for firm i when not exposed to the treatment. Y i is equal to one for training firms and zero for non-training firms, for the training quality Y i denotes to the quality measures training hours or relative productivity of the apprentice in the last year of training. The treatment D i represents preferential treatment of training firms in the public procurement process. D i takes the value one if an "apprenticeship training" criterion exists in the firm's field of activity and zero otherwise. As never both, Y i (1) and Y i (0) are observable for one firm, the unobserved potential outcome for each firm i has to be estimated.
Let the observed outcome Y i be denoted by:
For the estimation of the unobserved potential outcome (counterfactual), the matching method imputes the missing counterfactual by averaging outcomes of similar firms (with the same observable characteristics) in the sample but who were exposed to the other treatment. To ensure that the estimator identifies a causal and consistent treatment effect two assumptions have to hold: The first underlying assumption for an unbiased estimate of the causal effect is that there are no unobservables that affect the training decision and the choice of the firm to be active in an industry and canton where training firms are treated preferentially in the public procurement process at the same time (unconfoundness).
where X represents a set of observable characteristics. This unconfoundness assumption would be violated if firms would first choose to train or not and then, as a function of the first decision, choose their field of activity and the canton of location. As apprenticeship training is never the core business of a firm we can safely assume that firms first choose their field of activity and make their location decision and subsequently make their training decision. The location decision is independent of the existence of the training criterion in cantonal laws, and therefore, the treatment is random for firms with the same observables and the unconfoundness assumption holds.
The second assumption
holds when the probability of assignment is restricted between zero and one (Abadie et al., 2004) . This assumption holds for the sample of firms in industries with a considerable amount of public contracts, as there are enough firms with similar characteristics that are (not) affected by preferential treatment of training firms in public contracting (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
For the unobserved potential outcome the simple matching estimator (Abadie et al., 2004) is:Ŷ
where J M (i) denotes the set of indices for the matches for a firm i and #J M (i) the number of elements of J M (i). l represents the observations of the control group.
The matching estimator for the average treatment effect on the treated is then: 15 Table 3 presents the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for different firms being considered as treated firms. The results show bandwidths for the effect as different answering scenarios are assumed for the non-responses. 16 The results show that the ATT is positive for all scenarios. The effect is larger for firms that are in all their fields of activities affected by the policy ("yes" firms) compared to firms that are only in parts of their activities affected by the criterion ("partially" firms). Thus the criterion creates more incentives for firms being more heavily affected by the policy. This result underlines the existence of a causal effect of the public procurement instrument on training behavior. For all firms affected by the policy ("yes" and "partially" firms), the bandwidth of the effects on their training probability is between 19 to 32 percentage points. 17 Note: Matching variables: Industry (two-digit-level) and firm size. Estimates for different answering scenarios for "no answer" firms. Robust standard errors. "Yes" firms: firms that are affected by the policy in their whole field of activity. "Partially" firms: firms that are in some fields of activity affected by the policy This increase seems to be very high. However, one has to bear in mind that this effect considers only a very small fraction of firms in industries where public contracts are very important. Therefore, the effect size does not represent a large overall increase of training places. The present data does not allow identifying the effect on the whole apprenticeship market. However, we know that from all firms answering the question about the "apprenticeship training" criterion in our survey only about 20 percent were at least partially affected by the policy. 80 percent of the firms were not affected by the policy. Weighing the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) presented in Table 3 for these 20 percent reveals an overall effect on training probability of about 3.8 to 6.4 percentage points.
Results
However, the number of training firms does not represent the number of training places.
The number of newly created training places primarily depends on the size of the incentivized firms. If additional training places are created in small firms, then an additional training firm typically only provides one additional training position. If large firms were more likely to be incentivized by such a policy, then an additional training firm could create more than one additional training position. Moreover, additional training places could be created in training firms, increasing the number of apprentices. Table 4 shows average treatment effects on the treated by firm size. The results in Table 4 demonstrate that only small and medium firms with less than 50 employees are affected by the instrument, whereas large firms are not incentivized by the criterion. This result is in line with our hypotheses; large firms have higher training probabilities independent of the existence of the criterion as large firms train apprentices to a larger extent for investment reasons, i.e., to retain apprentices as skilled workers after training, they are less responsive to additional monetary incentives than smaller firms that predominantly have a production-oriented training motive (i.e., training creates a net benefit by the end of the program). Moreover, the probability of employing workers in at least one training occupation increases in firm size. Therefore, larger firms have more productive tasks for apprentices and can better integrate them into their production process, where apprentices create benefits for firms.
Conversely, small and specialized firms face greater difficulties in providing the required training content and are less able to allocate productive tasks to an apprentice. Beside the effect at the extensive margin, the criterion could also affect the number of apprentices in training firms. Some cantons consider the number of apprentices as a function of the total number of workers in the firm and the industry standard number of apprentices, when applying the "apprenticeship training" criterion. However, for the majority of rather small firms, one apprentice is standard. The results in Table 5 , therefore, show no effect of the criterion and are in line with the hypotheses that training intensity is not affected by the criterion. sufficiently high training quality. Table 6 reports the effects of the instrument on training quality. 19 In line with our hypotheses we cannot find any trade-off between training quantity and training quality, as there are no differences in the number of training hours and the relative productivity of apprentices in the last year of training between firms that are affected and those that are not affected by the criterion. Note: Matching variables: Industry (two-digit) and firm size. ATT for firms affected by the "apprenticeship training" criterion in the public procurement process compared to those than are unaffected. Missing values and firms partially affected are excluded. Robust standard errors. Significance level: *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01
Robustness Checks
The results elicited from the cross-section analysis reveal a positive effect of the social public procurement policy on training probability. However, whether these effects are truly causal or the result of unobserved heterogeneity between treated and non-treated firms cannot be answered with a cross-sectional comparison alone. Therefore, we additionally estimate the effect of this policy on training behavior exploiting that some cantons mentioned in their legal frameworks the possibility to treat training firms preferentially before The effect is estimated with a linear regression model (for more details see for example Angrist and Pischke, 2009) :
where D09 t denotes a dummy for the post-treatment period (cross-section 2009) and
Change c is a dummy that takes the value one for firms in cantons with changes in procurement legislation and zero otherwise. The vector X represents firm characteristics (firm size, language region, occupation, industry, and canton). 27 Table 7 presents the results of the difference-in-differences (see equation 7) estimation exploiting the fact that some cantons introduced the "apprenticeship training" criterion in their legal frameworks between 2004 and 2009, whereas the criterion was already in force in another group of cantons. The results suggest that the "apprenticeship training" criterion has a positive effect on training probability, however, estimation is not very precise and therefore the estimate no statistically significant. The results suggest that the introduction of the criterion increases training probability by 5.8 percentage points. This estimate remains relatively stable across all specifications and suggests that public purchasers use the criterion in contracting. The estimate lies within the range of the effect size identified in the first part of this paper and therefore confirms the results obtained by analyzing the cross-sectional data.
The effect identified in Table 7 is not estimated very precisely. There are several reasons for this: First, the difference-in-differences estimator identifies the effect of the introduction of the "apprenticeship training" criterion and not its application, whereas the result from the cross-section represents the effect of the application of the criterion 27 For descriptive statistics see Table A3 . (0.015)*** (0.021)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.042)*** Observations 9,052 9,052 9,052 9,052 9,052 R 2 0.003 0.078 0.105 0.115 0.13
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
in the majority of cantons. Second, it may not be the case that all public purchasers apply the criterion within a canton. Furthermore, cantonal borders do not perfectly reflect procurement markets. Firms can also apply for public works contracts outside their canton of residence. The existence of the criterion only increases the probability that a firm in the given canton is affected by the criterion. Moreover, local contracts are more important for small projects below the WTO-threshold 28, 29 .
Conclusion
The present paper analyzes the effectiveness of social public procurement policy on apprenticeship training in Switzerland. By allowing public purchasers to provide preferential treatment for training firms for certain types of public contracts, this procurement policy aims to reach social goals by using public contracts as an incentive for firms to offer training positions.
The results show that a public procurement policy can create incentives for nontraining firms and therefore generate additional training places. However, training firms do not increase the number of apprenticeship training places as a result of the policy.
The results suggest that the "apprenticeship training" criterion primarily affects small non-training firms in particular industries where public contracts play an important role (e.g., construction). Therefore, the number of potential firms that can be incentivized by such a policy is limited. The overall effect of the criterion on the national training probability is rather modest, with an increase in the range of about 3.8 to 6.4 percentage point.
Although there is a potential risk that firms incentivized by the policy do not provide training of adequate quality, our estimations show that there is no trade-off between additional training places and training quality. The quality for the newly created training places is of the same standard as that offered in other firms.
28 As mentioned above, the "apprenticeship training" criterion does not apply to contracts above a certain threshold.
29 Unfortunately, no information exists on the share of contracts with firms in a given canton.
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The results in this paper suggest that a public procurement policy successfully increased the number of training places in Switzerland. However, this public procurement policy also entails potential drawbacks. The analysis relies only on firms with a potential to train apprentices. However, there are a substantial number of very small and/or highly specialized firms that cannot train because there is no suitable training occupation in their (specialized) field of activity, or they cannot provide the apprentice with the required training content (or only at a very high cost). The preferential treatment of training firms entails the risk that such firms are discriminated against larger and/or less specialized firms.
Moreover, in periods in which apprentices are scarce (an issue in contemporary Switzerland due to demographic changes and competition for talented school-leavers with other educational tracks), the policy can lead to further discrimination and distortions in the apprenticeship market. In periods of shortages of apprentices, small firms in particular experience difficulties finding suitable apprentices, as large firms are more attractive for apprentices because they offer a wider variety of career opportunities after training. Therefore, such a public procurement policy could discriminate against small firms in periods when they are unable to find suitable apprentice as a result of the scarcity of apprentices.
Discrimination can also occur between small firms: When there is an oversupply of apprenticeship training places, most firms experience difficulties finding suitable apprentices.
Thus from the point of view of an individual firm that would like to hire an apprentice, successfully filling a training position (conditional on recruitment effort) becomes a random event. A public procurement policy would, in this case, discriminate against firms that intended to offer training in the first place. Therefore, governments should only apply such an instrument when there is a substantial need of additional training places.
Moreover, the policy can lead to allocative distortions between industries with and without public contracts. The preferential treatment of training firms affects only firms operating in industries with public contracts and therefore only affects certain training occupations. A public procurement policy, therefore, only creates advantages for firms in corresponding industries. In periods of shortages of apprentices, firms that benefit from the preferential treatment in public procurement may increase their recruitment effort to find apprentices, thereby increasing the scarcity of apprentices in other industries -even though career perspectives might be better in those other industries. Short-run aims, such as the award of a public contract, would then outweigh the long-run need for skilled workers and lead to allocative distortions.
In summary, this comprehensive assessment of the preferential treatment of training firms in public procurement demonstrates that the instrument is well-suited to create additional high-quality training places in periods when they are in short supply. However, the impact of the policy is limited to a very particular and small group of (small) firms.
Furthermore, when there is a shortage of apprentices the disadvantages of the instruments outweigh the benefits. Note: Only cantons that are used for the analysis
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